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 1 
LEGAL BASIS AND DELIMITATION OF COMPETENCE 
Panos Koutrakos 
 
The main parameters of the choice of legal basis  
 
The implications of the choice of the appropriate legal basis are not only practical, 
that is to determine the procedures whereby secondary measures are adopted and the 
input of the Union institutions in decision-making. As the Court of Justice pointed out 
in Opinion 2/00, ‘the choice of the appropriate legal basis has constitutional 
significance’.1 It indicates compliance with the principle of limited powers and 
determines the nature and extent of Community competence. In the words of the 
Court of Justice, ‘to proceed on an incorrect legal basis is … liable to invalidate the 
act concluding the agreement and so vitiate the Community's consent to be bound by 
the agreement it has signed. That is so in particular where the Treaty does not confer 
on the Community sufficient competence to ratify the agreement in its entirety, a 
situation which entails examining the allocation as between the Community and the 
Member States of the powers to conclude the agreement that is envisaged with non-
member countries, or where the appropriate legal basis for the measure concluding the 
agreement lays down a legislative procedure different from that which has in fact 
been followed by the Community institutions’.2 In the case of an agreement deemed 
to be concluded by the Community pursuant to an incorrect legal basis, the 
Community measure concluding the Agreement would be invalidated whilst the 
Agreement would be binding on the Community.3 This would necessitate not only the 
adoption of a new Decision but also, where appropriate, the submission of an 
amended declaration of competence.4 
 
The significance of the choice of the appropriate legal basis in EC external relations is 
illustrated by the special procedure set out in Article 300(6) EC which enables the 
Community institutions and the Member States to obtain the opinion of the Court as 
to whether an agreement envisaged is compatible with the provisions of this Treaty’. 
                                                 
1
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2
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 Case C-327/91 France v Commission, para. 25. 
4
 See, for instance, Council Dec. 2006/730/EC on the conclusion on behalf of the Community of the 
Rotterdam Convention [2006] OJ L 299/23. 
 2 
The raison d'être of this provision is deemed by the Court to forestall complications 
which would result from legal disputes stemming from agreements incompatible with 
EC law (Opinion 1/75, pp. 1360 and 1361, Opinion 3/94, para. 16, Opinion 2/94, 
paras 3 to 6, Opinion 2/00, para. 6). In this respect, it is noteworthy that the Court has 
construed it jurisdiction under Article 308(6) EC in wide terms.5  
 
Flowing from its constitutional function, another significant aspect of the choice of 
legal basis is its objective nature. According to the standard formulation put forward 
by the Court of Justice, ‘the choice of the legal basis for a Community measure must 
rest on objective factors amenable to judicial review’.6 It is in the light of this 
principle that ‘the fact that an institution wishes to participate more fully in the 
adoption of a given measure, the work carried out in other respects in the sphere of 
action covered by the measure and the context in which the measure was adopted are 
irrelevant’.7 
 
In the case of international agreements concluded by the EC, this objective nature 
takes on another dimension in so far as the choice of legal basis is relied upon by 
Community institutions or Member states as a way of addressing various practical 
concerns about the international posture of the Community. For instance, when the 
Commission argued that the conclusion of GATS and TRIPS fell within the exclusive 
competence of the Community either pursuant to Article 133 EC or the AETR 
principle or the so-called ‘necessity’ principle or Articles 95 and 308, it sought to rely 
upon the practical problems which would arise in relation to the administration of the 
Agreements if the Community and the Member States were to be found to share 
competence. Such problems, about the long discussions necessary as to whether a 
given matter falls within the Community or national competence and the right of the 
Member States to express their views individually on matters falling within their 
competence in cases where no consensus would be found, were viewed as 
undermining the Community’s unity of action vis-à-vis the rest of the world and 
weakening its negotiating power. Whilst viewing the above concerns as legitimate, 
the Court rejected the inferences made by the Commission. It was pointed out that 
                                                 
5
 Koutrakos, EU International Relations Law 186-191. 
6
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7
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‘any problems which may arise in implementation of the WTO Agreements and its 
annexes as regards the coordination necessary to ensure unity of action where the 
Community and the Member States participate jointly cannot modify the answer to 
the question of competence, that being a prior issue’.8 This approach has also been 
adopted more recently. In Opinion 2/00 where it was pointed out that ‘whatever their 
scale, the practical difficulties associated with the implementation of mixed 
agreements, which are relied on by the Commission to justify recourse to Article 133 
EC - conferring exclusive competence on the Community so far as concerns common 
commercial policy - cannot be accepted as relevant when selecting the legal basis for 
a Community measure’.9 
  
Instead, the link between the choice of the appropriate legal basis and the delimitation 
of competence and all the practical problems that this may raise is sought to be 
addressed by the principle of close cooperation. Having been introduced in the late 
1970s,10 the duty of cooperation became increasingly prominent in the Court’s rulings 
on external competence.11 It is beyond the scope of this paper to examine the duty of 
close cooperation. Suffice it to point out that its scope has been interpreted widely, 
covering both the Community institutions and the Member States in the process of 
negotiation, conclusion and application of international agreements. It has also been 
applied to the relationship between the Court of Justice and national courts in the 
process of the interpretation of international agreements.12   
 
Separate from, but related to, the objective nature of the choice of legal basis is the 
latter’s internal function in the Community legal order. As the Court pointed out in 
the late 1970s, ‘it is not necessary to set out and determine, as regards other parties to 
the Convention, the division of powers … between the Community and the Member 
States, particularly as it may change in the course of time. It is sufficient to state to the 
other contracting parties that the matter gives rise to a division of powers within the 
                                                 
8
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9
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 Ruling 1/78, paras 34-36. 
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Community, it being understood that the exact nature of that division is a domestic 
question in which third parties have no need to intervene’.13  
 
The above indicates the wide scope and multifarious ramifications of legal basis 
disputes. The aim of this paper is much more limited: first, to highlight the special 
problems raised by disputes about the choice of Article 133 EC as the appropriate 
legal basis; second, to discuss problems underpinning the delineation of EC 
competence in relation to Article 308 EC; third, to explore some of the issues which 
the management of the inter-pillar relations raise. In all three sections, for which a 
point of reference will be the parameters outlined in this introduction, some recent 
developments will provide the starting point for exploring these perspectives. 
 
The delineation of CCP  
 
The Common Commercial Policy is one of the very few legal bases conferring 
express external competence which has been part of the EC Treaty since the 
establishment of the Community. The Court of Justice laid down its main 
characteristics in the 1970s. However, reliance upon it has been shrouded in 
uncertainty whereas its relationship with other legal bases has been somewhat 
ambiguous.   
 
This became apparent, once more, when, earlier this year, the Court of Justice ruled 
on the conclusion of the Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent 
Procedure (PIC) for certain hazardous chemicals and pesticides in international 
trade.14 Following an annulment action brought by the Commission, it held that the 
Convention had been wrongly concluded on behalf of the Community under Article 
175(1) EC. Instead, it should have been concluded under both Articles 133 and 175(1) 
EC, as it ‘includes, both as regards the aims pursued and its contents, two 
indissociably linked components, neither of which can be regarded as secondary or 
indirect as compared with the other, one falling within the scope of the common 
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 Ruling 1/78 (re: Draft Convention of the International Atomic Energy on the Physical Protection of 
Nuclear Materials, Facilities and Transports), para. 35. 
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 Case C-94/03 Commission v Council, judgment of 10 January 2006, nyr. 
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commercial policy and the other within that of protection of human health and the 
environment’.15  
 
The judgment in Rotterdam Convention followed a number of cases in the recent 
years where the Court of Justice was called upon to rule on the legal basis of 
international agreements with a trade and environmental law dimensions. In Opinion 
2/00, it was held that the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, adopted within the 
framework of the Convention on Biological Diversity, pursued an environmental 
objective. The Court ruled, in no uncertain terms, that the Protocol, aimed at 
regulating the transboundary movement of any living modified organisms resulting 
from modern biotechnology, was an environmental measure which affected trade with 
non-member countries only incidentally. A year later, the Court held that the Energy 
Star Agreement with the United States on the coordination of energy-efficient 
labelling programs for office equipment was a trade measure which ought to have 
been adopted under Article 133 EC.16  
 
The Rotterdam Convention judgment sits uncomfortably with the above judgments. In 
Article 1, its objective is described as follows: ‘to promote shared responsibility and 
cooperative efforts among Parties in the international trade of certain hazardous 
chemicals in order to protect human health and the environment from potential harm 
and to contribute to their environmentally sound use’. This objective is to be achieved 
‘by facilitating information exchange about [the] characteristics [of those chemicals], 
by providing for a national decision-making process on their import and export and by 
disseminating these decisions to Parties’. At the very core of the Convention is the 
application of the PIC procedure to exports and imports of certain hazardous 
chemicals and pesticides. This procedure applies to products listed in an annex to the 
Convention as well as other ‘banned or severely restricted chemicals’ and ‘severely 
hazardous pesticide formulations’. A system of information is established whereby 
the parties communicate, through a Secretariat, their decision to ban or severely 
restrict trade in hazardous chemicals and pesticides and the importing parties 
                                                 
15
 Para. 51. Following the Court’s judgment, the Rotterdam Convention was concluded under Council 
Dec. 2006/730/EC [2006] OJ L 299/23 where reference to the judgment (preamble, paras 2 and 3). 
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 Case C-281/03 Commission v Council. 
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communicate their decision as to whether to consent to future imports of such 
products.  
 
In its judgment, the Second Chamber of the Court acknowledged that the protection of 
human health and the environment was ‘the most important concern in the mind of the 
signatories of the Convention’, a fact which was ‘clearly apparent’ and ‘unequivocally 
confirm[ed]’ in the preamble and the wording of the Convention (para. 37). However, 
it went on to point out that its provisions ‘also contained rules governing trade in 
hazardous chemicals and having direct and immediate effects on such trade’ (para. 
42). The Court pointed out the reference to ‘trade’ in the title of the Convention and 
observed that, whilst typically an instrument of environmental policy, the PIC 
procedure would be applicable to products subject to trade. Deemed to establish ‘a 
specific link between trade and the environment’ (para. 44), the Convention was 
viewed by the Court as providing for a number of measures “‘governing’ or 
‘regulating’ international trade … and therefore fall[ing] within the scope of the 
common commercial policy’ (para. 46).  
 
In its judgment, the Court is not consistent with its approach in Opinion 2/00. In 
particular, the judgment lays itself open to criticism on three main grounds. First, it 
engages in a quite selective reading of the Rotterdam Convention. It refers, for 
instance, to the preamble to the Convention, according to which ‘trade and 
environmental policies should be mutually supportive with a view to achieving 
sustainable development’. However, it ignores the identically expressed provision in 
the preamble to the Cartagena Protocol.17 This omission is all the more regrettable in 
the light of the fact that the relevant preambular paragraphs of the Cartagena Protocol, 
which, in Opinion 2/00, was ruled by the Court to fall squarely within the scope of 
environmental protection policy, had been agreed upon by the parties precisely 
pursuant to the relevant provisions of the Rotterdam Convention, the latter having 
been concluded five months prior to the initiation of the negotiations for the 
conclusion of the Cartagena Protocol. For instance, in its fourth preambular 
paragraph, the Convention refers to ‘the circumstances and particular requirements of 
the developing countries and countries with economies in transition in particular the 
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need to strengthen national capabilities and capacities for the management of 
chemicals, including transfer of technology, providing financial and technical 
assistance and promoting cooperation among the Parties’. Furthermore, it is also 
recognised in the preamble ‘that good management practices for chemicals should be 
promoted in all countries, taking into account, inter alia, the voluntary standards laid 
down in the International Code of Conduct and the UNEP Code of Ethics on the 
International Trade in Chemicals’. In addition, the Parties express their ‘desir[e] to 
ensure that hazardous chemicals that are exported from their territory are packaged 
and labelled in a manner that is adequately protective of human health and the 
environment, consistent with the principles of the Amended London Guidelines and 
the International Code of Conduct’. Whilst describing the main principles 
underpinning the policy function of the Convention, these statements are ignored by 
the Court.    
 
Second, the judgment puts forward a narrow reading of the Rotterdam Convention. It 
does so by seeking to distinguish it from the Cartagena Protocol. It points out that, 
contrary to the latter, the former is characterised by ‘an explicit link between trade 
and the environment’.18 It is correct that the Rotterdam Convention is applicable to 
imports and exports of chemicals; it is also correct that the advance informed 
agreement procedure set out in the Cartagena Protocol is applicable to transboundary 
movement of living modified organisms in general, that is including, in the Court’s 
own words, ‘illegal and ‘unintentional transboundary movements, movements for 
charitable or scientific purposes and movements serving the public interest’. 
However, by focusing on the need for this ‘explicit link’, the Court appears to adopt a 
quite formalistic approach. The application of the Convention to products whose 
movement is subject to export and import rules does not necessarily render its 
provisions of a trade nature. The Convention sets out a procedural framework aiming 
at enabling the importing countries to make an informed choice as to the harmful 
effects that the import and export of certain chemicals and pesticides would have on 
human health and the environment. This point is analysed by Advocate General 
Kokott who points out that ‘international trade in certain chemicals which the 
Contracting Parties have agreed as hazardous is thus merely the external point of 
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reference of the PIC procedure’.19 In her Opinion, she argues that the PIC procedure 
can only have indirect effects on trade, either by facilitating trade in hazardous 
chemicals by increasing transparency of the relevant rules or by making trade more 
expensive for an exporter. However, she argues, ‘no commercial policy rules’ fall 
within the scope of the Convention:20 no common rules are laid down on whether and 
on what conditions the import of hazardous chemicals may or must be permitted or 
refused, no rules are laid down on the mutual recognition of products. 
 
Third, in its judgment, the Court ignores both the origins the Rotterdam Convention 
and the policy context within which it developed. Rio and 2002 Johannesburg 
Conferences, the judgment does not take into account the environmental protection 
objective which is at the very core of its inception and development. Indeed, in terms 
of the main scheme it seeks to establish and its substantive content, the Rotterdam 
Convention did not appear in a vacuum. The legal regulation of chemicals in terms of 
their impact for the environment and public health had been the subject of 
international initiatives since the 1970s. UNEP set up the International Register for 
Potentially Toxic Chemicals in 1976 which was entrusted with the compilation and 
circulation of information about chemical hazards. The UN General Assembly had 
regularly referred to the need for more effective information exchange on hazardous 
chemicals.  
 
In the 1980s, there were two international frameworks dealing with chemicals. The 
first was the Code of Conduct on the Distribution and Use of Pesticides which was 
developed under the auspices of the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and 
adopted by the latter’s Conference in 1985.21 Developed in close cooperation with the 
plant science industry, international organisations and NGOs, the FAO Code of 
Conduct includes provisions of wide scope, covering the management and testing of 
pesticides, measures to reduce health hazards, availability, use, distribution of and 
trade in pesticides, information exchange, labelling, packaging, storage and disposal. 
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 Para. 36 of her Opinion where she goes on to point out that ‘[t]he real subject-matter of the 
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chemicals, but only the exchange of information by the Contracting Parties on their import practices … 
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 9 
The second framework consisted of the London Guidelines for the Exchange of 
Information on Chemicals in International Trade which was adopted by the 
Governing Council of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).22 The 
London Guidelines include provisions about the establishment of national authorities 
through which states would communicate information about banned or severely 
restricted chemicals. This would establish a channel of communication which would 
enable countries to make informed choices when confronted with the prospect of 
imports of such chemicals. In addition, a number of provisions were laid down on 
chemicals management, classification, packaging and labelling 
 
The PIC procedure had become central to the discussion about the development of the 
above sets of recommendations and principles. As early as in 1983, the UN General 
Assembly pointed out that ‘products that have been banned from domestic 
consumption and/or sale because they have been judged to endanger health and the 
environment should be sold abroad by companies, corporations or individuals only 
when a request for such products is received from an importing country or when the 
consumption of such products is officially permitted in the importing country’.23 The 
PIC procedure was incorporated in both the FAO Code of Conduct and the London 
Guidelines in 1989 when they were amended for that purpose. Applicable to banned 
or severely restricted substances, this incorporated a formalised system whereby the 
UNEP or FAO respectively would communicate the position of participating 
countries regarding the import of the above substances. The procedure under the two 
documents was managed by a joint secretariat. 
 
Therefore, the Convention owes its existence and its rules to an incrementally 
developed and solid body of principles and procedures which were firmly established 
within the sphere of environmental policy. Indeed, it was in the light of the above 
initiatives and on the basis of the arrangements laid down thereunder that the 
Rotterdam Convention was negotiated under the responsibility of both UNEP and 
FAO. In other words, there is a distinct thread which links the FAO Code and the 
London Guidelines to the subject matter of the judgment in the Rotterdam Convention 
case. The former had been adopted in response to the then increasing movement to the 
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 UNEP GC/DEC/15/30, UN Doc. UNEP/PIC.WG.2/4 (1989). 
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South of pesticides banned in the North and the ensuing environmental problems in 
the developing countries.24 And the compulsory PIC system set out in the Rotterdam 
Convention was applied pursuant to interim arrangements prior to the latter’s entry 
into force.25  
 
Finally, there is another point for which the judgment in the Rotterdam Convention is 
subject to criticism. This is the reasoning behind the decision to annul the Decision 
concluding the Agreement on behalf of the Community. We know that recourse to the 
inappropriate legal basis vitiates the procedure for adopting the measure in question 
when the legislative procedure actually followed satisfies the requirements of the 
legislative procedure which ought to have been applied under the correct legal basis. 
In Case C-491/01 BAT and Case C-2190/03 Swedish Match the Court ruled that 
Directive 2001/37 on the approximation of national rules concerning the manufacture, 
presentation and sale of tobacco products should have been adopted under Article 95 
EC alone rather than Articles 95 and 133 EC. However, this was held not to 
necessitate the annulment of the Directive because ‘such an error in the legal basis 
relied on for a Community measure is no more than a purely formal defect’:26 both 
provisions required majority voting in the Council and, under the correct legal basis, 
the Parliament had been involved under the codecision procedure. 
 
In the light of this, one would have thought that the Court would reach the same 
conclusion in the Rotterdam Convention judgment. This was suggested by Advocate 
General Kokott who had pointed that, in accordance with Article 175 EC, the Council 
had adopted the Decision in question by qualified majority voting and the Parliament 
had been consulted. Whilst the Court refers to both points, it reaches the conclusion 
that the Decision should be annulled following a reference to a third, additional point. 
In para. 55, the Court points out the following:  
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 P. Barrios, ‘The Rotterdam Convention on Hazardous Chemicals: A Meaningful Step Toward 
Environmental Protection?’, (2004) 16 Geo. Int’l Envtl L Rev 679 at 710. 
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… it is important to note that, by basing the decision approving the Convention on the dual 
legal basis of Article 133 EC and Article 175(1) EC, the Community is also giving indications 
to the other parties to the Convention both with regard to the extent of Community 
competence in relation to that Convention which … falls both within the scope of the 
common commercial policy and within that of the Community environmental policy, and 
with regard to the division of competences between the Community and its Member States, a 
division which must also be taken into account at the stage of implementation of the 
agreement at Community level.  
 
The arguments put forward in this part of the judgment are badly drafted. The Court 
justifies the need to annul the Decision ‘having regard to al the foregoing’,27 namely 
the procedural compatibility between Articles 133 and 175 EC and the external-point-
of-view argument quoted above. The former clearly do not justify the annulment – in 
fact, the contrary is the case. However, the most important point is that the annulment 
of the Decision is justified on the basis of its external significance. Arguably, the 
subject-matter of the Rotterdam Convention judgment is distinct from that in the BAT 
and Swedish Match cases, both of which were about the legality of unilateral 
measures adopted by the Community institutions. Does the Court mean to say that it 
is the conclusion of the international agreement which renders the annulment of the 
Decision in question necessary? If so, this rationale appears to be at variance with one 
of the main tenets of EC external relations, namely the internal aspect of the choice of 
the appropriate legal basis, which follows from the constitutional function of such 
choice. This was articulated clearly in the late 1970s, where the Court pointed out that  
 
‘it is not necessary to set out and determine, as regards other parties to the Convention, the 
division of powers … between the Community and the Member States, particularly as it may 
change in the course of time. It is sufficient to state to the other contracting parties that the 
matter gives rise to a division of powers within the Community, it being understood that the 
exact nature of that division is a domestic question in which third parties have no need to 
intervene’.28  
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This was later reaffirmed in Opinion 2/00.29 Therefore, the Courts’ conclusion 
appears to be at variance with established case-law. The Court’s conclusion, and the 
emphasis on implementation in its rationale, may be understood in two ways. First, an 
explanation may lie in another judgment delivered in the same date with the 
Rotterdam Convention one, namely Case C-178/03 Commission v Parliament and 
Council where the Court held that Regulation 304/2003 implementing the Rotterdam 
Convention should also have been based on Article 133 EC along with Article 175(1) 
EC and, for that reason, it was necessary to be annulled. However, the conclusion of 
an international agreement and the adoption of the implementing measure are two acts 
which may well be adopted on different legal bases.30  
 
Second, the annulment of the Decision, and the submission of a new declaration of 
competence, might be seen to suggest that more attention should be paid to the 
uncertainty that third parties often face when dealing with the Community and its 
Member States in the context of multilateral international agreements. This state of 
uncertainty may appear more significant as it is linked to the question of 
responsibility for the implementation of such agreements. However, it should be 
pointed out that, in fact, declaration of competence, to which the Court appears to be 
paying considerable attention (eg MOX Plant) do not always assist third countries in 
their understanding of who does what and who is responsible for what under EC law. 
For instance, the declaration of competence submitted by the Community on its 
accession to the Hague Conference on Private International Law (once the 
amendments to its Statute allowing the accession of a regional economic integration 
organisation has entered into force) is not only very long but also contains statements 
outlining the existence and dynamic nature of the EC external competence following 
AETR and Opinion 1/76.31 Considering that it has taken the Community more than 
thirty years to clarify the precise scope, effects and repercussions of those principles – 
and there is still some way to go – it is rather curious that the Community’s 
international partners should be expected to decipher them on the basis of broadly 
worded declarations. The second point is made by Cremona who points out, ‘there is a 
danger, if decisions as to legal base are seen as a signal to third countries, that the 
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 Opinion 1/94, para 29 re: agricultural products.  
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 See Annex II to Council Dec. 2006/719/EC [2006] OJ L 297/1 at 5. 
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issue of choice of legal base will become even more politicised than it is already, 
making it more difficult to base that choice purely on “objective factors which are 
amenable to judicial review’”.32 
 
In the light of all the above (and not merely because the judgment was delivered by a 
Chamber), to what extent, if at all, does the judgment in the Rotterdam Convention 
case signify a shift in the Court’s position? And where do we stand, in relation to the 
delineation of competence in the CCP area? Marise Cremona writes that ‘we now 
have three cases deciding respectively that en environmental legal base was 
appropriate (Opinion 2/2000), that the CCP base was appropriate (Case C-281/01 
Commission v Council (Energy Star Agreement)) and that a dual legal base should 
have been used (Case 94/03 Commission v Council); it does not however, seem any 
easier to predict the outcome of a future case on the same issue’.33 This is 
undoubtedly correct. In fact, the standard formulation that ‘the choice of the legal 
basis for a Community measure must rest on objective factors’ is only partly accurate: 
whilst the choice of legal base is not be dependent upon ‘an institution’s conviction as 
to the objective pursued’,34 it becomes apparent from the Court’s case-law that this 
may not be determined on the basis of specific, easily identifiable criteria either.  
 
A degree of uncertainty is inevitable in the process underpinning the choice of legal 
basis. In a legal order where the institutional balance is ill-defined and, at times, 
incrementally redefined, the choice of legal basis is a potentially politicised matter.35 
However, the position of Article 133 EC in the spectrum of potential legal bases has 
been distinctly uneasy, shrouded in factual and normative uncertainty. The starting 
point for this was the typically unhelpful wording of Article 133(1) EC and its 
procedural dimension (QMV) which rendered this provision both too difficult for the 
Commission to resist as a legal basis and too unattractive to the Council and a number 
of Member States. 
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 External Relations of the EU and the Member States: Competence, Mixed Agreements, International 
Responsibility, and Effects of International Law (EUI Working Papers, Law No 206/22) n50. 
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 Case 45/86 GSP , para. 11. 
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Things were not helped by the expansive interpretation of the scope of Article 133 EC 
adopted by the Court of Justice in the early days of the CCP. In the early 1970s, it was 
held that the concept of commercial policy has the same content whether it is applied 
in the context of the international action of a State or to that of the Community’.36 
Three years later, it was pointed out that ‘it would no longer be possible to carry on 
any worthwhile common commercial policy if the Community were not in a position 
to avail itself also of more elaborate means devised with a view to furthering the 
development of international trade. It is therefore not possible to lay down, for Article 
[133 EC], an interpretation the effect of which would be to restrict the common 
commercial [policy to the use of instruments intended to have an effect only on the 
traditional aspects of external trade to the exclusion of more highly developed 
mechanisms such as appear in the agreement envisaged. A “common commercial 
policy” understood in that sense would be destined to become nugatory in the course 
of time’.37 In a similar vein, the notion of CCP was given a wide meaning in the 
Generalised Tariff Preferences case where it was pointed out that ‘[t]he link between 
trade and development has become progressively stronger in modern international 
relations’ (para. 17).  
 
Another development linked to the wide definition of the scope of CCP is the 
articulation of the exclusivity that Community’s competence has been held to enjoy. 
In the mid-1970s, it was held that conceived … in the context of the operation of the 
Common Market, for the defence of the common interests of the Community, within 
which the particular interests of the Member States must endeavour to adapt to each 
other’, the CCP ‘quite clearly, is incompatible with the freedom to which the Member 
States could lay claim by invoking a concurrent power, so as to ensure that their 
interests were separately satisfied in external relations, at the risk of compromising 
the effective defence of the common interests of the Community.38 This entailed that 
Member States could only act within the scope of CCP pursuant to a specific 
authorization granted under Community law.39  
 
                                                 
36
 Opinion 1/75, 1362. 
37
 Opinion 1/78, para. 44. 
38
 Opinion 1/75, p1364. 
39
 Case 41/76 Criel, née Donckerwolke et al. v Procureur de la Republique au Tribunal de Grande 
Instance, Lille et al. [1976] ECR 1921, Case 174/84 Bulk Oil [1986] ECR 559 
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The apparently severe implications of exclusivity, coupled with the very wide 
formulation of the scope of CCP and the provision for QMV, appeared to define a 
policy which ‘represents the EC at the height of its legal powers, control and 
supremacy over the member states’.40 However, a number of factors indicated, even at 
that early stage of the development of the CCP, that that perception was not quite as 
accurate as it might have appeared. Its broad pronouncements notwithstanding, the 
Court adopted a distinctly pragmatic approach to their application in practice. For 
instance, the exclusive nature of Community competence did not always exclude the 
Member States from concluding an agreement falling within the scope of CCP. In 
Opinion 1/78, the financing of the International Agreement on Natural Rubber was 
deemed essential to the determination of whether the Member States could conclude 
it. In a similar vein, the Court sanctioned the disuniform application of CCP rules in 
the 1980s, acknowledging the incomplete nature of the policy as it then stood.41 As a 
matter of fact, that lack of uniformity was sanctioned by the Community institutions 
too.42 Finally, in relation to trade measures with foreign policy implications, the 
Member States are granted wide discretion in determining whether a deviation from a 
CCP measure is necessary in order to protect their security.43 
 
Another indication of the somewhat flexible nature of Article 133 EC was provided 
by the way it was instrumentalised in the 1980s and early 1990s for the imposition of 
sanctions against third countries.44 In order to address the practical and legal problems 
that the imposition of sanctions pursuant to unilateral measures had raised, the 
Member States decided to rely upon Article 133 EC in order to set up sanctions 
regime following a political decision to that effect adopted by the representatives of 
the Member States within the European Political Cooperation framework. This 
formula, first employed against the Soviet Union in 1982, was abandoned when 
Article 301 EC was inserted in the EC Treaty at Maastricht, hence providing an 
express link between the first and second pillars. It is interesting in this respect that 
the material scope of the latter provision is broader than that of Article 133 EC.    
 
                                                 
40
 D. McGoldrick, International Relations Law of the European Union (1997) 70. 
41
 M. Cremona, ‘The Completion of the Internal Market and the Incomplete Commercial Policy of the 
European Community’, (1990) 15 ELRev 283.  
42
 See Koutrakos, 21-32. 
43
 Case C-367/89 Richardt, C-70/94 Werner and C-83/94 Leifer. 
44
 See Koutrakos, Trade, Foreign Policy and Defence in EU Constitutional Law (2001) 60-65. 
 16 
Therefore, even early on, the reality of the application of Article 133 EC was 
considerably more subtle than some of the sweeping pronouncements of the Court had 
suggested. In fact, the definition of its scope and the construction of its normative 
implications defined a policy which was attuned to the legal and political context 
within which it emerged. This became apparent in the 1990s, when the CCP was 
interpreted in more restrictive terms in Opinion 1/94. In its ruling, the Court 
consistently rejected the Commission’s invitation to construe Article 133 EC as an all-
encompassing economic relations legal basis. Instead, whilst not negating the 
principle of a widely understood CCP,45 it went on to make it clear that that policy 
could not be construed in too wide terms. The ruling in Opinion 1/94 is permeated by 
a concern to ensure that the definition of CCP would not encroach upon other EC 
Treaty provisions. In relation to IP rights, for instance, it was pointed out that ‘if the 
Community were to be recognized as having exclusive competence to enter into 
agreements with non-member countries to harmonize the protection of intellectual 
property and, at the same time, to achieve harmonization at Community level, the 
Community institutions would be able to escape the internal constraints to which they 
are subject in relation to procedures and to rules as to voting’.46 
 
This line of reasoning suggests a shift of emphasis from safeguarding the 
effectiveness of CCP on to safeguarding the characteristics of other parts of the 
institutional structure of the Community legal order. An aspect of this shift became 
apparent in the Opinion 2/00 when the Court was asked to determine the appropriate 
legal basis for the conclusion of the Rotterdam Convention. To the invitation of the 
Commission to uphold its earlier statements about a widely construed CCP, the Court 
responded as follows:47  
 
‘the fact that numerous international trade agreements pursue multiple objectives and the 
broad interpretation of the concept of common commercial policy under the Court's case-law 
are not such as to call into question the finding that the Protocol is an instrument falling 
principally within environmental policy, even if the preventive measures are liable to affect 
trade relating to LMOs. The Commission's interpretation, if accepted, would effectively 
                                                 
45
 For instance, it was pointed out that ‘trade in services cannot immediately, and as a matter of 
principle, be excluded from the scope of Article [133]’ (para. 41). 
46
 Para. 60. 
47
 Para. 40. 
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render the specific provisions of the Treaty concerning environmental protection policy 
largely nugatory, since, as soon as it was established that Community action was liable to 
have repercussions on trade, the envisaged agreement would have to be placed in the category 
of agreements which fall within commercial policy. It should be noted that environmental 
policy is expressly referred to in Article 3(1)(l) EC, in the same way as the common 
commercial policy, to which reference is made in Article 3(1)(b)’. 
 
What is interesting about this extract is that the wording of the ruling is identical to 
that used twenty three years earlier when the Court sought to enhance the 
effectiveness of Article 133 EC. In essence, what had been deemed worthy of 
protection became subject to manipulation in order to undermine the effectiveness of 
other legal bases for external action. This is indicative of a shift of emphasis rather 
than one of policy. In the 1970s, a period of articulation of the main tenets of EC 
external action, it was sensible that the normative foundation and effectiveness of the 
then emerging CCP should have been protected. This approach was also consistent 
with other strands of EC external relations case-law, such as the definition of the 
foundation for and implications of implied competence. On the other hand, in the 
1990s, not only had the mechanics of the exercise of the EC external competence 
accepted as part of our mainstream Community vocabulary but a number of specific 
legal bases had been inserted in the EC Treaty.    
 
 
The delineation of EC competence - Article 308 EC 
 
Article 308 EC reads as follows:  
 
If action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in the course of the operation of 
the common market, one of the objectives of the Community and this Treaty has not provided 
the necessary powers, the Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the 
Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, take the appropriate measures.  
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Otherwise known as the flexibility clause or la petite revision,48 Article 308 EC 
appears to be quite broad in its scope, and has certainly been invoked by the 
Community institutions, with the Member States’ agreement, quite widely in the past. 
It was famously instrumentalised by the Member States in areas such as environment, 
where, in 1972, the Conference of Heads of State and Government, held in Paris, 
resolved to establish a specific policy in the area, with the suggestion that use should 
be made of the legal basis afforded by Articles 94 and 308 EC. The applicability of 
Article 308 EC in the area of external relations having been asserted in the AETR 
judgment,49 it was then used for the conclusion of a number of environmental 
agreements, too.50  In addition, prior to hew introduction of Article 181 EC, the 
Community granted emergency food aid to non-associated states in the 1980s under 
Article 308 EC.  
 
Whilst politically expedient, this use of Article 308 EC has been criticised.51 Weiler 
argued, ‘tongue in cheek, that, on this reading defence would also be a permissible 
usage of Art. [308], since the common market could hardly function with the 
territories of the Member States under occupation.52 However, the wording of Article 
308 EC makes it clear that reliance upon it is dependent upon three conditions: 
Community action should prove necessary for the attainment of one of the objectives 
of the Community; this should be the case in the course of the operation of the 
common market; there should be no other provision of the EC Treaty providing the 
necessary powers.  
 
I argue that these conditions should be interpreted strictly. As Advocate General 
Tizzano pointed out in his Opinion in the Open Skies cases, ‘that article does not 
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 See R. Schütze, ‘Organized Change towards an “Ever Closer Union”: Article 308 EC and the Limits 
to the Community’ Legislative Competence’, (2003) 22 YEL 79. 
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 19 
confine itself to requiring a measure to be “necessary if Community competence is to 
be justified, but lays down precise conditions and procedures for the determination of 
that necessity and, hence, whether it is capable of founding such competence’.53  
 
At various instances, the Court has sought to clarify the relationship between Article 
308 EC and other general legislative clauses, such as Articles 94 and 95 and held that 
the latter serve as the legal basis for the harmonisation of existing provisions and the 
coordination of the basic provisions of future laws, whereas Article 308 EC provides 
the legal basis for any new act or the introduction of a new legal form. For instance, in 
Opinion 1/94 it was held that the Community is competent, in the field of intellectual 
property, to harmonise national laws pursuant to Articles 94 EC and 95 EC and may 
use Article 308 EC as the basis for creating new rights superimposed on national 
rights such as the Community trademark.54 In addition, the Court has enforced the 
residual nature of Article 308 EC at various instances.55  
 
However, the Court has been much more reticent in elucidating the other conditions 
for its application. In terms of its scope, it was held in Opinion 2/04 that Article 308 
‘cannot serve as a basis for widening the scope of Community powers beyond the 
general framework created by the provisions of the Treaty as a whole and, in 
particular, by those that define the tasks and the activities of the Community’.56 
However, this by no means clarifies the conditions under which this provision may be 
relied upon – in its ruling, the Court opined that the constitutional ramifications of 
                                                 
53
 Para. 53. In terms of the use of Art. 308 EC for the exercise of external competence, it is interesting 
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accession by the Community to the ECHR would be such as to render reliance upon 
Article 308 EC impossible.57 
  
In terms of endowing the Community with external competence, the Court ruled in 
Opinion 1/94 that it ‘cannot in itself vest exclusive competence in the Community at 
international level’, save for the principle of necessity under Opinion 1/76.58  
 
The competence of the Community to impose sanctions on third countries tested the 
limits of the CCP up until the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty and the provision for 
a specific legal basis. However, the scope of sanctions imposed under that legal basis, 
along with Article 308 EC, has recently tested the limits of Community competence 
and the jurisdiction of the Community judiciary.  
 
The burning question is now the use of Article 308 EC by the CFI in Yusuf and 
Kadi.59 This provision was interpreted both in strict and wide terms, in that order. 
First, the CFI focused on the requirement that reliance upon Article 308 EC was 
necessary for the attainment of one of the Community objectives. The CFI examined a 
number of objectives, namely the establishment of CCP (Art. 3(1)(b)EC), the 
establishment of a system which would ensure that competition is not distorted (Art. 
3(1)(g) EC), and the abolition of obstacles to intra-Community movement of capital 
(Art. 3(1)(c) EC).  All were deemed incapable of being attained by the sanctions 
regime freezing up funds.  
 
As the judgments are much discussed,60 rather than reciting all the arguments made by 
the Court, I shall focus on the following points. 
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The EC objectives in Art. 3 EC 
 
First, the judgment reads like an effort to produce an outline of the law of EU external 
relations. At times, this gives it a rather sweeping tone. For instance, in ruling that the 
measure in question did not serve the establishment of the CCP, the CFI pointed out 
that the Community’s commercial relations with a third country were not at issue and 
went on to state that, in relation to CCP, the EC had the competence to impose 
sanctions under Article 133 EC. Even if the relations between the EC and a third 
country would have been at issue, it would have been Article 301 EC rather than 
Article 133 EC which would have relevant. Not much weight should be attached to 
this statement. 
 
Second, the part of the judgment dealing with Article 308 EC is underpinned by a 
strict approach to compliance with the conditions laid down in that provision. For 
instance, in relation to targeting distortions of competition, the CFI observed that no 
argument had been made about how freezing up assets of natural and legal persons, 
either at Community or national level, would have affected competition between 
undertakings (para. 144). It becomes apparent that no general statement about the 
function of a measure in the context of the law of the internal market would be 
deemed sufficient to justify recourse to Article 308 EC. It added that ‘a mere finding 
that there was a danger of disparities between the various national rules and an 
abstract risk of obstacles to the free movement of capital or payments or of distortions 
of competition liable to result therefrom’ would not be sufficient to justify recourse to 
Art. 308 EC for two reasons: on the one hand, the primary rules on competition and 
approximation of laws would be rendered ineffective and, on the other hand, judicial 
review would be rendered ‘quite nugatory’ (para. 147).  
 
The rulings suggest that a detailed assessment of the specific function and 
implications of an Art. 308 EC is the yardstick against which reliance upon that 
provision would be sanctioned. Viewed from this angle, it follows the line first put 
forward by the Court of Justice in Tobacco Advertising where such a test was applied 
in relation to the suitability of another difficult-to-delineate legal basis, namely Art. 
95 EC.  
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In fact, the CFI goes further and casts doubt on the necessity on the function of the 
measure in question and its purported aim to ensure the abolition of impediments to 
intra-Community movement of capital. It states that the Member States enjoy the right 
to impose restrictions on such movement, provided that these are necessary and 
proportionate in order to protect public policy or public security (para. 146). This 
would seem to suggest that the Community institutions would have an even more 
serious task in convincing the Community judiciary of the necessity for Community 
intervention. To that effect, the implementation of the sanctions regime, as set out in 
the UNSC Resolutions, by the Member States themselves, rather than the Community, 
is deemed as perfectly innocent, in terms of possible discrepancies. To that effect, the 
CFI relies upon what it views as the clear, precise and detailed content of the 
Resolutions and the relatively minor measures for which they are calling.  
 
The position of the fight against international terrorism within the spectrum of the 
Community objectives permeates the entire ruling. However, once again, at times this 
appears to undermine the clarity of the ruling. For instance, the fight against 
international terrorism and the imposition of economic and financial sanctions, such 
as the freezing of funds, are viewed interchangeably in the Court’s effort to link them 
to the objectives laid down in Arts 2 and 3 EC. However, the former is the main 
objective which is the latter, the instrument, purports to serve. This is merely another 
indication of the somewhat ‘confused’ line of reasoning.  
 
EC and EU objectives 
 
The Court, then deals with the possibility of viewing the fight against international 
terrorism as a more general objective which the Community has to ensure. It is 
recalled that this type of argument had already put forward by the Commission in 
Opinion 2/94 where it described respect for human rights ‘as a transverse objective 
forming an integral part of the Community’s objective’ (V.2 of the ruling). The 
Commission had also referred to the preamble to the SEA and its reference to respect 
for human rights and to the Convention.  
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The CFI rejects this argument on the basis of a textual approach: ‘nowhere in the 
preamble to the EC Treaty is it stated that that act pursues a wider object of 
safeguarding international peace and security’ and there is no ‘reference whatsoever 
to the implementation of a common foreign and security policy’, the latter falling 
exclusively within the EU objectives. Whilst this might appear too positivist an 
interpretation of primary law, the judgment is actually a little bit more nuanced in so 
far as it does acknowledge a degree of interaction between the EC and EU objectives: 
‘admittedly, it may be asserted that that objective of the Union must inspire action by 
the Community in the sphere of its own competence, such as the common commercial 
policy’ (para. 155). This suggests that there is a link between the first and second 
pillar, albeit one which is limited in its effect: ‘[that objective of the Union] is not … a 
sufficient basis for the adoption of measures under Article 308 EC, above all in 
spheres in which Community competence is marginal and exhaustively defined in the 
Treaty’ (ibid). 
 
This statement acknowledges that the EC external policies may not be adopted and 
carried out in a legal and economic vacuum, completely devoid from any other policy 
considerations. This is consistent with the construction of trade measures with foreign 
policy implications adopted by the Court of Justice. It is also consistent, and this is 
more relevant in practical terms, with the Court’s construction of development policy. 
The statement in Yusuf mentioned above is reminiscent of the tenor of the judgment 
the India Cooperation Agreement case where the Court sanctioned the inclusion of a 
human rights clause as an essential element of the Agreement. In that case, the Court 
dealt with the other side of the argument with which the CFI dealt in Yusuf: it had 
been argued that the inclusion of the human rights clause and its characterisation as an 
essential element of the Agreement necessitated recourse to Article 308 EC. Whilst 
the Court rejected this approach by relying upon the reference to ‘the general 
objective of developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law, and to that 
of respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms' in Article 170(2), it also 
highlighted the very specific function of the clause in the Agreement with India: no 
specific field of cooperation between the EC and India was provided in the 
 24 
Agreement as a result of this clause. This approach was applied to the clause relating 
to energy.61  
 
The CFI, then, goes on to articulate its view on the extent to which the EU objectives 
may inform EC actions. The relevant extract is worth-citing in full: 
 
… the coexistence of Union and Community as integrated but separate legal orders, and the 
constitutional architecture of the pillars, as intended by the framers of the Treaties now in 
force, authorise neither the institutions nor the Member States to rely on the ‘flexibility 
clause’ of Article 308 EC in order to mitigate the fact that the Community lacks the 
competence necessary for achievement of one of the Union’s objectives. To decided 
otherwise would amount, in the end, to making that provision applicable to all measures 
falling within the CFSP and police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters (PIJ), so that 
the Community could always take action to attain the objectives of those policies, Such an 
outcome would deprive many provisions of the Treaty on European Union of their ambit and 
would be inconsistent with the introduction of instruments specific to the CFSP (common 
strategies, joint actions, common positions) and to the PJC (common positions, decisions, 
framework decisions) (para. 156). 
 
This is an interesting paragraph. So far, in the few cases where the relationship 
between the pillars was at issue, the emphasis was distinctly on the protection of the 
integrity of the Community legal order. In the Airport Transit Visa case, for instance, 
the Court made it clear that policing the dividing line between the EC and the other 
pillars was essential in order to ensure that action adopted under the latter would not 
impinge upon the former: ‘[i]t is … the task of the Court to ensure that acts which, 
according to the Council, fall within the scope of [the Title VI TEU provision] do not 
encroach upon the powers conferred by the EC Treaty on the Community’ (para. 16). 
Similar concerns underpinned the judgment in Centro-Com where the right of 
Member States to carry out their foreign policy beyond the Community legal order 
was acknowledged, albeit in compliance with Community law. In the judgments in 
Yusuf and Kadi, the Community judiciary appears prepared to assume the role of the 
guardian of CFSP rules, that is a set of rules excluded from its jurisdiction, whose 
integrity it seeks to protect against an expansive interpretation of Article 308 EC. 
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Therefore, by highlighting the limits of Community competence, the Community 
judiciary appears to become not only the ultimate arbiter of constitutionality in the 
Community legal order but also the guardian of the Union architecture. It is 
interesting that in the highly politicised case of the Agreement with USA on 
processing of personal data, the Court ruled that Decision 2004/496 should not have 
been adopted under Article 95 EC, albeit without engaging in the internal market-
oriented enquiry suggested by AG Léger.62 The Agreement has now been concluded 
on behalf of the European Union under Articles 24 and 38 TEU.63 
 
It is a sign a maturity of Community law and confidence of its institutions that the 
ambit of its policies, as set out in some of its open-ended provisions, is defined with 
due regard for other external policies. Indeed, it is recalled that the ruling in Opinion 
2/00 was underpinned by a clear effort to prevent the scope of Article 174 EC from 
being impinged upon by an expansive interpretation of Article 133 EC. Interestingly 
enough, the Court did so by using language similar to that used twenty five years 
earlier when it had deemed it necessary to protect the scope of the then emerging 
CCP: ‘if accepted, [the Commission’s interpretation] would effectively render the 
specific provisions of the Treaty concerning environmental protection policy largely 
nugatory’ (para. 40).  
 
However, the CFI suggested a more dynamic view of the interacting pillars: the 
sanctions provisions, Articles 301 and 60 EC are ‘quite special provisions of the EC 
Treaty’ (para. 160) aimed to achieve EU objectives, hence rendering ‘action by the 
Community … in actual fact action by the Union’ (para. 161). This is the reason why 
Art. 308 EC comes into play: ‘the powers to impose economic and financial sanctions 
provided for by Articles 60 EC and 301 EC, …, may be proved insufficient to allow 
the institutions to attain the objective of the CFSP, under the Treaty on European 
union, in view of which those provisions were specifically introduced into the EC 
Treaty’ (para. 163).  
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This formula has been viewed as ‘intelligent’.64 Indeed, it may appear to enhance the 
ability of the Union to impose sanctions, in conformity with the emerging 
international practice, whilst avoiding the pitfalls of interpreting Article 308 EC 
unduly widely. In other words, the effectiveness of the contested measure is 
sanctioned, albeit pursuant to an apparently textual reading of two exceptional EC 
Treaty provisions rather than a teleological interpretation of the ‘flexibility clause’. 
This seems consistent with the paramount significance that the Court of Justice 
attaches to the effectiveness of sanctions regimes imposed by the Union in 
implementing UNSC resolutions (Bosphorus, Ebony Maritime).  
 
In this respect, three points are worth-making. First, this approach leads to a paradox: 
whilst seeking to interpret Article 308 EC strictly and reject recourse to it in order to 
safeguard the integrity of CFSP, the CFI ends up interpreting Title V TEU. Indeed, it 
rules that ‘the fight against international terrorism and its funding is unarguably one 
of the Union’s objectives under the CFSP, as they are defined in Article 11 EU, even 
where it does not apply specifically to third countries or their rulers’ (para. 167). 
Furthermore, in order to justify recourse to Article 308 EC, the CFI refers to the 
requirement of consistency laid down in Article 3 TEU, that is another TEU provision 
excluded from its jurisdiction pursuant to Article 46 TEU.  
 
Second, what would have been the alternative formula for the imposition of sanctions, 
had the Community been deemed to lack the competence either pursuant to Article 
308 EC or Articles 301 and 60 EC or all three provisions put together?  The measures 
in question would have had to be implemented by Member States. Any problems 
raised in the free movement of capital would be assessed against the exceptional 
clause of Article 58(3) EC. This was referred to by the CFI in its rulings. And indeed, 
should this have been the case, the Centro-Com requirement of compliance with 
Community law would have been met. In fact, the CFI appears to entertain this 
possibility as it refers to the straight-forward content of the Security Council 
Resolutions. One should wonder about this possibility. After all, it would have hardly 
been the only case of sanctions agreed at CFSP level and then implemented by 
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Member States at national level (eg prohibition on entry into, or transit through, the 
territory of Member States of certain officials of Belarus, arms embargo etc).       
 
Third, in order to further justify recourse to Article 308 EC, the CFI relies upon 
Common Position 2002/402, recalls its unanimous adoption by the Council in relation 
to the fight against international terrorism and points out that ‘it prescribes the 
imposition by the Community of economic and financial sanctions’ of the type laid 
down in the contested measure (para. 168, emphasis added). This point raises the 
question of the relationship between the measures adopted under the inter-pillar 
formula envisaged in Articles 301 and 60 EC. In fact, what the Common Position 
states is that  
 
the European Community, acting within the limits of the powers conferred on it by the Treaty 
establishing the European Community:  
-shall order the freezing of the funds and other financial assets or economic resources 
of the individuals, groups, undertakings and entities referred to in Article 1, 
- shall ensure that funds, financial assets or economic resources will not be made 
available, directly or indirectly, to or for the benefit of the individuals, groups, undertakings 
and entities referred to in Article 1.  
 
Furthermore, in the last recital of the preamble to the Common Position, it is stated 
that  
 
Action by the Community is needed in order to implement certain measures.  
 
Article 95 EC 
 
Article 95 EC reads as follows:  
 
By way of derogation from Article 94 and save where otherwise provided in this Treaty, the 
following provisions shall apply for the achievement of the objectives set out in Article 14. 
The Council shall, acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 251 and after 
consulting the Economic and Social Committee, adopt the measures for the approximation of 
the provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States which 
have as their object the establishment and functioning of the internal market. 
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In Opinion 1/94, it was pointed out that ‘it is undeniable that, where harmonizing 
powers have been exercised, the harmonization measures thus adopted may limit, or 
even remove, the freedom of the Member states to negotiate with non-member 
countries. However, an internal power to harmonize which has not been exercised in a 
specific field cannot confer exclusive external competence in that field on the 
Community’.65 
 
The residual nature of Article 95 EC has been underlined by the Court.66 Furthermore, 
the conditions for reliance upon Article 95 EC have been interpreted strictly by the 
Court in Tobacco Advertising and BAT. It was held that measures adopted under that 
provision must genuinely have the object of improving the conditions for the 
establishment and functioning of the internal market, they must actually contribute to 
the elimination of obstacles to the economic freedoms guaranteed by the EC Treaty, 
including the removal of distortions of competition. It was also held that, although 
reliance upon Article 95 EC is possible if the aim of the measure is to prevent the 
emergence of future obstacles to trade resulting from divergent development of 
national laws, the emergence of such obstacles must be likely and the measure in 
question must be designed to prevent them.  
 
Recourse to Article 95 EC has recently become the centre of attention following the 
judgment of the Court in PNR case. In the PNR case, the Court avoided this issue. It 
focused on the link between the Agreement and the Commission Decision on 
adequacy adopted under Directive 95/46: as the latter excludes from its scope the 
processing of personal data in the course of an activity which falls outside the scope 
of EC law, and in any case processing operations concerning public security, defence 
State security and the activities of the State in areas of criminal law’ (para. 54) and the 
former concerned processing operations concerning public security and the activities 
of the state in areas of criminal law (para. 56), Article 95 ‘read in conjunction with 
Article 25 of the Directive, cannot justify Community competence to conclude the 
Agreement’ (para. 67.  
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Advocate General Léger, on the other hand, did examine that issue. He refers to the 
aim of the Agreement as defined in its preamble, according to which two objectives 
are pursued. The first was preventing and combating terrorism and related crimes and 
other serious crimes that are transnational in nature, including organised crime; 
pursuit of this objective was attested to by the reference in the second recital of the 
preamble to the US legislation adopted after 9/11. The second objective was 
respecting fundamental rights and freedoms, notably privacy, the pursuit of which 
was manifested through the reference to Dir. 95/46. He then went on to point out that 
these two objectives must be pursued simultaneously, a conclusion substantiated on 
the basis of the content of the Agreement.  
 
He then went on to ascertain whether the conditions for the application of Article 95 
were met. Whilst he accepted that, in the absence of Community intervention, a risk 
of uncertainty would arise (some Member States would legislate in order to prevent 
their airlines from being sanctioned by the US authorities, whilst some others might 
not) and this could have financial implications for certain airlines an, therefore, give 
rise to distortions of competition, he concluded as follows: 
 
… the fact remains that such an objective of preventing distortions of competition, to the 
extent that it is actually pursued by the Council, is incidental in character to the two main 
objectives of combating terrorism and other serious crimes and protecting passengers’ 
personal data, which … are expressly mentioned and actually implemented in the provisions 
of the agreement.  
 
He then relied upon the Tobacco Advertising judgment which made it clear that ‘the 
mere fact that an act may affect the establishment or functioning of the internal 
market is not sufficient to justify using that provision as the basis for that act’. 
 
As for the urgent need for the agreement to be concluded and the reference to it in its 
preamble, he argued that this was deemed necessary for procedural reasons, that is to 
get the Parliament’s Opinion as soon as possible, rather than substantive reasons 
relating to the aim and content of the Agreement.  
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It is interesting that Advocate General Léger also addresses the issue of the 
appropriate legal basis, one which he characterises as ‘tricky’ (para. 157) and which 
he does not consider it necessary for the Court to address. What he does is to make 
some general observations, in essence viewing the measure in question as an act of 
cooperation between public authorities and alluding that the Community legal 
framework would not be the appropriate legal framework for its adoption.  
 
Sure enough, after quite intense negotiations with USA, a new Agreement was 
concluded by the Union under Articles 24 and 38 TEU.67 
 
There are two points to make. First, in relation to the specific subject matter of the 
PNR Agreement, it is understandable that the Court should have chosen not to address 
the issue of interpretation of Article 95 EC. In any case, it is very difficult to see quite 
how could Article 95 EC provide the legal basis for the adoption of such an 
Agreement when its effects on the functioning of the internal market would be, at 
most, only incidental. Second, on a more general point, it is suggested that Article 95 
EC should be interpreted in its very specific context which does require the adoption 
of internal rules.68  
 
Managing cross-pillar relations  
 
The recent case-law of the Court of First Instance on smart sanctions suggests that the 
regulation of the relationship between the EC and CFSP frameworks is bound to arise 
in the context of legal basis disputes.69 Furthermore, the issues of delineation of 
competence that such disputes raise give rise to questions of jurisdiction of the 
Community judiciary. Such issues have arisen in Case C-354/04 P Gestoras Pro 
Amnistia v Council and C-355/04P Segi v Council. It is recalled that in the actions for 
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damages before the Court of First Instance, Segi had argued that the Council had 
chosen Articles 15 and 34 TEU as the legal basis for a common position referring to 
them as involved in terrorist acts, fraudulently in order to avoid all democratic and 
judicial control. Whilst acknowledging that ‘indeed probably no effective remedy is 
available to [the applicants]’, the CFI rejected their claim and stated that ‘the absence 
of a judicial remedy cannot in itself give rise to Community jurisdiction in a legal 
system based on the principle of conferred powers, as follows from Article 5 EU’.70 
This was the case despite The relevant provision of the Common Position, which 
required that the Member States rely upon all available legal means to facilitate police 
and judicial cooperation regarding enquiries and proceedings conducting by their 
authorities in respect of, amongst others, the applicant was deemed to fall within the 
scope of Title VI TEU. 
 
On appeal, Advocate General Mengozzi delivered his Opinion on 26 October 2006. 
He agreed with the conclusion of the Court of First Instance, namely that the 
Community judiciary had no jurisdiction over the matter. However, he argued in 
detail that it would be unacceptable for the Union to legislate beyond the Community 
legal framework without enabling its citizens to have access to appropriate channels 
of judicial review. To that effect, he urged the Court to conclude that, as a matter of 
EU law, individuals would enjoy the right to compensation in the national courts for 
possible infringement of their rights caused by a common position.  
 
The following two points made by AG Mengozzi are interesting. First, he emphasises 
the external dimension of the state of the European Union if the CFI statement about 
the absence of judicial remedy was accurate. He underlines ‘the primary importance 
which the versions of the EU and EC Treaties … give to the principle of the rule of 
law and the protection of fundamental rights’ (para. 75), points out that ‘where 
judicial remedy is absent, the action of the union may in fact infringe with impunity 
all the other rights and fundamental freedoms which the Union professes to respect’ 
(para. 82) and states that  
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85. If in a case such as that of the appellants there is genuinely no effective judicial remedy, 
this would not only be an extremely serious and flagrant inconsistency of the system within 
the Union, but also a situation which, from an external point of view, exposes the Member 
States of the Union to censure by the European Court of Human Rights and not only impairs 
the image and identity of the Union on the international plane but also weakens its negotiating 
position vis-à-vis third countries, creating a theoretical risk that they will activate clauses on 
the respect of human rights (so-called ‘conditionality clauses’), which the Union itself ever 
more frequently requires to be included in the international agreements it signs.  
 
86. In particular, from the point of view of observance of the obligations undertaken by the 
Member States when they signed the ECHR, it is entirely improbable that the European Court 
of Human Rights would extend to the third pillar of the Union the presumption of equivalence 
in the protection of the fundamental rights that it has established between the ECHR and 
Community law, or the ‘first pillar’ of the Union, and which leads that Court to carry out only 
a ‘marginal’ review of the compatibility of acts adopted by the Community institutions with 
the ECHR.  On the other hand, it is highly likely that, in the course of a full examination of 
the compatibility of acts adopted by the institutions under Title VI of the EU Treaty with the 
ECHR, the European Court of Human Rights will in future rule that the Member States of the 
Union have infringed the provisions of that Convention, or at least Articles 6(1) and/or 13. 
 
Second, his focus on the role of national courts as Union courts in this sensitive area 
is tied in with the increasing significance of the role that national courts are called 
upon to assume in the context of EC external relations.   
 
In addition to the above two points, I would like to explore the following interrelated 
points: (a) the issues which the ‘objective nature’ of the choice of appropriate legal 
basis may raise when applied across the pillars; (b) whether it is defensible any longer 
to prevent the Community judiciary from reviewing the relevant second and third 
pillars measures completely and whether it is time a system of (differentiated) 
jurisdiction was introduced.    
  
